MK3 BLOG

MKitch3|Sept. 22,2025

Every country has its favorite myths. Ours are red, white, blue, and stamped with two words that people swear mean the same thing: freedom and liberty. They don’t. They never did. And the fact we keep pretending otherwise is one of the reasons American law, politics, and daily life have been one long tug-of-war between what we think we’re promised and what we’re actually allowed.

The Bare Bones: Legal and Philosophical Roots

Freedom is the raw condition of being unconstrained. It’s the natural state—what philosophers call a negative right, an absence of interference.

Liberty is freedom that has been recognized, structured, and (inevitably) limited by law. It’s not the absence of restraint but the protection against arbitrary restraint.

Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651), defined liberty as “the absence of external impediments.” John Locke upped the ante, calling liberty a natural right, but one that had to exist under law for civil society to function.

Black’s Law Dictionary draws the line clean:

• Freedom: “The absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint.”

• Liberty: “Freedom from arbitrary restraint, especially by government.”

So freedom is the wild field. Liberty is the fenced pasture the state swears you can run around in.

Founding Era: The Word Choices That Still Haunt Us

• Declaration of Independence (1776): Jefferson wrote “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” He didn’t say “freedom.” Liberty here was a philosophical ideal, imported straight from Locke.

• Constitution (1787): The preamble promised to “secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” The Bill of Rights mixed the two: freedom of speech, freedom of the press—but framed them as liberties that government couldn’t touch.

• Federalist Papers (1787-88): Madison and Hamilton tossed the words around strategically. Madison warned that liberty without structure dissolves into anarchy. Hamilton argued too much freedom would shred the Union.

The Founders, in short, used both words with purpose. Freedom was a condition; liberty was a principle.

The Timeline: Law, Politics, and the Shrinking (or Expanding) Circle

1798 – The Alien and Sedition Acts

• Congress criminalized criticism of the government. Freedom of speech existed in theory; liberty was mutilated in practice. Jefferson and Madison pushed back in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, claiming liberty was being crushed by federal overreach.

1860s – The Civil War and the 13th Amendment

• Lincoln’s rhetoric danced between liberty and freedom. He said at Gettysburg the war would bring a “new birth of freedom.” The legal system codified liberty for the formerly enslaved—but reality lagged a century behind.

1866 – Civil Rights Act

• Congress declared all persons born in the U.S. citizens with “full and equal benefit of all laws.” Freedom on paper. Liberty in practice? Still throttled by Black Codes and Jim Crow.

1917–1918 – The Espionage and Sedition Acts

• World War I saw dissent criminalized again. Eugene Debs went to prison for anti-war speech. The Supreme Court (in Schenck v. United States, 1919) blessed it, birthing the “shouting fire in a crowded theater” doctrine. Freedom got an asterisk.

1941 – FDR’s Four Freedoms Speech

• Roosevelt reframed freedom globally: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear. Two were classic liberties; two were positive rights requiring massive government action.

1960s – Civil Rights Movement

• Martin Luther King Jr. talked about freedom ringing from every mountainside, but the fight was about liberty—forcing the state to honor rights it had already promised. Civil Rights Act (1964) and Voting Rights Act (1965) tried to close the gap.

2001 – The Patriot Act

• Freedom shrank in the name of security. Liberty was recast as something you have only if you’re not suspected of terrorism. The state’s leash tightened.

2020 – Pandemic Restrictions

• “Freedom” became the battle cry of those resisting mandates. “Liberty” became the lawyered-up justification for state power: public health outweighed personal autonomy.

Quotes That Show the Creep

• Patrick Henry (1775): “Give me liberty, or give me death!” — fiery, but limited to a select class.

• Abraham Lincoln (1864): “The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty.” — still true.

• Benjamin Franklin (1759): “Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” — a warning ignored every generation.

• Justice Brandeis (1928, Olmstead v. U.S. dissent): “The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”

Freedom vs. Liberty in the Real World

• Speech: Freedom means you can say what you want. Liberty means the courts decide if what you said qualifies as “protected.”

• Travel: Freedom suggests you can move wherever. Liberty is why you still need ID at TSA and a passport at borders.

• Property: Freedom says you own your land. Liberty is the zoning board telling you what you can’t build on it.

Why It Still Matters

Freedom is the banner. Liberty is the contract. One fires the imagination, the other locks horns with reality. Every major American conflict—political, social, or cultural—sits in that gap.

• Too much freedom without structure = chaos (see: mob rule).

• Too much liberty without freedom = authoritarianism dressed in legalese.

The Founders knew it, Lincoln knew it, Roosevelt twisted it, and we’re still choking on the difference.

The Punchline

Freedom is what you claim.

Liberty is what survives the lawyers, the judges, and the politicians.

The American project, at its best, is keeping those two words close enough that citizens don’t feel conned. At its worst, it’s watching the distance grow until freedom becomes rhetoric, and liberty becomes permission slips.

MKitch3|Sept. 21, 2025

This is my white paper of the public research on CBDC system design across central banks, BIS/IMF handbooks and large technical pilots. This research is a year in the making and still has a long way to go. 

Executive summary

Public research converges on a few core CBDC design choices that determine performance, privacy, resilience and policy control. Across dozens of proofs-of-concept and pilots, three patterns recur: two-tier distribution with public–private roles; modular architectures that mix centralized and distributed components; and granular policy controls implemented via wallets and APIs rather than “programmable money” embedded in the ledger itself. Offline payments remain achievable but complex; privacy can be enhanced with selective disclosure or Chaum-style eCash techniques; and cross-border efficiency gains are real in wholesale settings, where PvP/DvP workflows and atomic settlement reduce settlement risk. 

1) Design goals and constraints

Policy objectives

Typical goals: maintain monetary sovereignty and singleness of money, improve payments resilience/competition, enhance financial inclusion and cross-border efficiency, and safeguard privacy proportional to AML/CFT obligations. Recent official surveys find 94% of central banks exploring CBDCs, with retail work most advanced and a sharp uptick in wholesale pilots. 

Non-functional requirements

CBDC systems target very high throughput and low latency, fault tolerance, cyber resilience, and robust governance. BIS emphasizes modular system design and the feasibility of combining centralized and decentralized components. 

2) Core architectural choices

2.1 Distribution model

• Single-tier: central bank provides wallets and services directly. Simple but burdens private sector innovation and scale.
• Two-tier (prevailing model): central bank runs the core infrastructure/ledger; intermediaries handle customer-facing services, onboarding, compliance and innovation. BIS Project Rosalind prototypes an API layer that exposes central bank ledger functions to private providers in a two-tier model.  

2.2 Ledger and processing

• Centralized, sharded processors: Project Hamilton (MIT/Boston Fed) shows that a centrally managed, in-memory transaction processor can reach very high throughput while keeping the ledger technology agnostic; the codebase (OpenCBDC) demonstrates alternative data structures.  
• DLT or hybrid: Many wholesale pilots (Helvetia, Cedar, Jura, mBridge, Dunbar) use permissioned DLT to enable atomic PvP/DvP across institutions and currencies, often with each currency on its own ledger bridged by orchestration.  

2.3 Token vs account abstractions

Designs vary between account-based models, UTXO-style tokens, or hybrids. BIS projects explore UTXO semantics for retail tokens (Rosalind glossary), while other work abstracts accounts at the API layer and treats “balance changes” as events. 

2.4 API-first architecture

Rosalind frames an extensible API layer to standardize integration, enable innovation, and enforce policy via access-controlled endpoints rather than custom ledger logic. 

3) Privacy, data minimization, and compliance

3.1 Spectrum of privacy

Central bank papers stress that CBDC privacy is not binary. Designers can hide data from some actors while revealing to others under due process, using architectural, cryptographic and governance controls. 

3.2 Techniques

• Selective disclosure & PETs: Bank of Canada surveys PETs (ZK proofs, MPC, TEEs, differential privacy) for CBDC contexts, noting maturing but still limited production readiness.  
• Chaumian eCash prototypes: BIS Project Tourbillon explores quantum-resistant eCash variants that offer payer anonymity while maintaining anti-counterfeiting controls and scalability.  
• Policy direction in major jurisdictions: ECB’s preparation-phase reports emphasize “high privacy” for online and offline transactions, with holding limits and offline design under development. UK work considers privacy-enhancing approaches for a potential digital pound.  

3.3 AML/CFT and supervision

Policy levers tend to sit in wallet layers and onboarding processes; APIs can enforce tiered limits, KYC regimes, and transaction monitoring, preserving central bank separation from personal data where politically required. Rosalind explicitly targets compliance while retaining a two-tier model. 

4) Offline payments

Offline is defined as value transfer between devices without network connectivity. BIS Project Polaris provides the de facto handbook and a higher-level design guide, concluding there is no one-size-fits-all solution; solutions require secure hardware, tamper resistance, risk caps, lifecycles, and procedures for re-sync and double-spend handling. Most offerings are not yet live at scale. 

5) Resilience and security lessons from live deployments

• DCash outage (ECCU): a region-wide interruption was traced to an expired certificate in the Hyperledger Fabric deployment, underlining certificate management and operational discipline as critical to CBDC availability.  
• Sand Dollar (Bahamas): ongoing modernization aims to interoperate with a national fast payments platform; early research focused on inclusion outcomes and payment efficiency.  
• eNaira (Nigeria): initial adoption and awareness challenges documented by IMF and CBN; architecture follows a two-tier DLT model with phased rollout.  
• JAM-DEX (Jamaica): launch supported by onboarding incentives; adoption strategy research highlights the role of targeted bonuses.  

6) Cross-border and interoperability designs

6.1 Wholesale corridors

• mBridge: multi-central-bank platform for instant cross-border settlement reached MVP in 2024; BIS subsequently stepped back, leaving central bank partners to continue development.  
• Jura & Helvetia: SNB/Banque de France/BIS experiments proved PvP/DvP settlement with wCBDC integrated into banks’ core systems and legal frameworks.  
• Cedar (NY Fed) & Cedar x Ubin+: FX spot settlement on DLT reduced settlement time to seconds in simulated environments, exploring multi-ledger atomicity.  
• Dunbar: common multi-CBDC platform design and governance insights for cross-border payments across several central banks.  

6.2 Retail corridors

• Icebreaker: hub-and-spoke model connecting domestic retail CBDCs for cross-currency payments with FX competition at the hub.  

7) Retail platform and API design

• Rosalind (BIS/BoE): demonstrates how an API layer can mediate wallet functions, consent, and policy rules while keeping the core ledger minimal; glossary covers UTXO, RTP/ARTP, verifiable credentials.  
• Sela (HKMA/Bank of Israel/BIS): introduces an “access enabler” intermediary to widen competition while maintaining cybersecurity and cash-like properties; non-banks can connect directly to the central bank ledger under this model.  
• Aurum (HKMA/BIS): two-tier system issuing both intermediated CBDC and a CBDC-backed stablecoin, informing Hong Kong’s e-HKD research.  

8) The digital euro, digital pound and US policy research

• Digital euro: ECB is in a preparation phase focusing on high privacy, offline capability, and holding limits while EU legislation progresses. Recent communications press lawmakers to accelerate the legal framework.  
• Digital pound: BoE/HM Treasury 2023 consultation and 2024 response outline a two-tier model and emphasize privacy by design; separate work with MIT DCI explores privacy-enhancing techniques.  
• United States: Federal Reserve’s 2022 discussion paper and public comment summary frame benefits, risks and design considerations without endorsing issuance. Technical research at the New York Fed and Boston Fed continues via Cedar and Hamilton.  

9) Technology building blocks

• Identity & credentials: tiered KYC with verifiable credentials; policy knobs (limits, age-restricted features) applied at wallet layer.  
• Cryptography: ZK proofs, VOPRFs and blind signatures are under active evaluation; eCash variants show strong privacy for payer anonymity with anti-counterfeiting controls.  
• Offline secure elements: secure enclaves/SE chips and tamper-resistant counters mitigate double-spend; reconciliation protocols cap offline risk exposure.  
• Message and data standards: ISO 20022 alignment and standardized APIs are recurring themes in BIS/IMF materials; resilience requires disciplined key, cert and secrets management, per DCash lessons.  

10) Governance, risk and operational readiness

• Cyber and operational resilience: IMF’s CBDC handbook chapters and notes focus on securing the ecosystem across central bank, intermediaries and vendors, including incident response, change control and supply-chain risks.  
• Legal positioning: EU is actively legislating a digital euro; UK and US remain in consultation/research phases. Wholesale pilots often operate under existing legal frameworks with central bank oversight.  

11) Open design debates (2025)

1. How much privacy is enough? Europe signals strong privacy commitments; technical PETs are improving but are not yet “turnkey” at national scale.  
2. Retail vs wholesale first: Many jurisdictions prioritize wholesale CBDC to resolve settlement risk and cross-border frictions; retail remains politically sensitive.  
3. Offline at scale: Feasible, but device security, risk caps, user UX and merchant hardware remain open challenges.  
4. Interoperability: Competing architectures exist for cross-border flows (hub-and-spoke vs shared platforms vs interlinked ledgers); governance is as hard as the tech.  
5. Role of central banks vs private sector: Sela and Rosalind show viable models for widening competition while preserving the central bank core.  

12) Comparative snapshot of flagship projects (non-exhaustive)

13) Practical design checklist (what consistently works)

1. Start two-tier with an API gateway between the core ledger and intermediaries; build policy in wallets and APIs.  
2. Target ledger minimalism, keep programmability at the edges; use event-driven integration to existing RTGS and fast-payments systems.  
3. Engineer privacy by design with selective disclosure and PETs; adopt jurisdiction-specific defaults and due-process access controls.  
4. Treat offline as a separate subsystem with its own risk, device, and lifecycle model; cap value and frequency while offline.  
5. Plan for cross-border early: decide whether to interlink domestic systems (Icebreaker), join shared platforms (mBridge/Dunbar), or pursue bilateral corridors (Jura/Helvetia).  
6. Don’t neglect ops: certificates, keys, and change control can take you down faster than code bugs, as DCash showed.  

14) Annotated bibliography (selected, by theme)

System architecture and APIs

• BIS: CBDCs – System design (2024). Modular, mix-and-match components; privacy as a key design axis. 

• BIS/BoE: Project Rosalind report (2023). API prototypes and wallet functionality. 

• MIT/Boston Fed: Project Hamilton / OpenCBDC (2022). High-performance retail core. 

Offline payments

• BIS Polaris: Handbook (May 2023) and High-level design guide (Oct 2023). Canonical offline design references. 

Privacy

• Bank of Canada: Privacy in CBDC technology (2020) and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for CBDC (2025). 

• BIS: Project Tourbillon (2023). eCash with privacy/security/scalability. 

Wholesale cross-border

• NY Fed: Project Cedar (2022–23). FX PvP on DLT, multi-ledger atomicity. 

• BIS/partners: Project Dunbar (2022), mBridge (2022–24), Jura (2021), Helvetia (2022). 

Retail cross-border

• BIS: Project Icebreaker (2023). Hub-and-spoke rCBDC corridor with competitive FX. 

Regional deployments

• Bahamas: Sand Dollar modernization (2025) and inclusion studies. 

• Nigeria: eNaira design paper (2021) and IMF one-year review (2023). 

• Jamaica: adoption and incentive design. 

• ECCU: DCash outage post-mortems. 

Jurisdictional programs and law

• ECB digital euro prep-phase updates and legal track. 

• BoE/HMT digital pound consultation and responses. 

• Federal Reserve: Money and Payments (2022) + public comments summary (2023). 

15) Minimum viable blueprint for a retail CBDC (synthesized)

1. Core: centralized, scalable transaction processor with append-only log and deterministic state machine; HSM-backed keying and continuous audit. Hamilton-style throughput targets.  
2. Interfaces: Rosalind-style API gateway enforcing rate limits, consent, limits, tiered KYC and programmability via rules engines.  
3. Distribution: two-tier intermediaries (banks and non-banks; Sela access-enabler option) for onboarding, AML, customer support.  
4. Wallets: reference mobile wallet and SDK with PETs for selective disclosure and offline risk caps per Polaris.  
5. Resilience: multi-region active-active, cert automation, staged rollouts, chaos testing; explicit incident runbooks learned from DCash.  
6. Cross-border: interlinking strategy evaluated early (Icebreaker hub vs mBridge/shared corridors vs bilateral PvP/DvP like Jura).  

16) Appendix: quick pointers to primary sources

• BIS “CBDCs – System design” PDF (2024).  
• BIS Project Rosalind report (2023).  
• BIS Project Polaris handbook + design guide (2023).  
• MIT/Boston Fed Project Hamilton + OpenCBDC.  
• NY Fed Project Cedar Phase I and technical appendix.  
• BIS Projects mBridge, Dunbar, Jura, Helvetia; updates and PDFs.  
• ECB digital euro preparation-phase updates (2024).  
• BoE/HMT digital pound consultation (2023) and site (2025).  
• IMF CBDC Virtual Handbook: cybersecurity and design notes (2023–24).  
• Live deployments: Sand Dollar (Bahamas), eNaira (Nigeria), JAM-DEX (Jamaica), DCash (ECCU).  

Bottom line

If you distill the public research, the safest, most future-proof pattern is a two-tier, API-first system with a minimal core, PET-hardened wallets, explicit offline subsystem, and an early cross-border strategy. The rest is governance, ops and politics, which, as DCash and EU legislative delays remind everyone, can make or break the tech. 

MKitch3|Sept. 21,2025

You can’t open a financial journal or scroll a central banker’s LinkedIn feed without stumbling on four letters: CBDC. Central Bank Digital Currency.

Depending on who you ask, it’s either the evolution of money, or the most polite dystopia since QR codes on restaurant menus. But strip away the hype, and what you find is a mountain of research papers, pilots, and stress-tested prototypes. Taken together, they form a rough blueprint of what a CBDC system will actually look like if and when the switch gets flipped.

This piece digs into that blueprint—the tradeoffs, the pilots, and the recurring design patterns that matter.

Why are central banks obsessed with this?

At a high level, the goals are surprisingly sober:

• Keep control of monetary sovereignty as cash usage declines.

• Boost payment resilience in case commercial systems collapse.

• Nudge competition in retail payments where a handful of private players dominate.

• Explore inclusion and cheap cross-border rails that don’t take three days and a kidney to settle.

As of 2025, 94% of central banks are officially “exploring” a CBDC. Translation: everyone’s tinkering, but only a handful are in live production.

Core design choices

The research converges on a few forks in the road:

1. Distribution model: The overwhelming favorite is “two-tier.” The central bank runs the core ledger, while private banks and fintechs handle onboarding, compliance, and wallet innovation. BIS’s Project Rosalind is the poster child here, sketching out an API layer that lets intermediaries plug in without the central bank becoming a retail help desk.

2. Ledger structure: Some experiments lean into distributed ledgers (think wholesale corridors like Project Jura or mBridge), while retail pilots often look suspiciously like a high-performance centralized database (see Project Hamilton’s blazing throughput demo).

3. Token vs. account: Do you want each digital “note” to exist like a token (UTXO style), or do you just update account balances? Answer: both, depending on who’s running the pilot.

4. Programmability: Everyone likes to whisper about “programmable money.” In reality, most designs punt policy enforcement to the wallet and API layer—transaction limits, KYC rules, consent frameworks—not hard-coded into the core ledger.

The privacy dilemma

This is where the politics crash into the math. CBDCs force societies to pick a point on the spectrum between cash-like anonymity and panopticon-level traceability.

Options on the table:

• Selective disclosure: Share data only with regulators when due process demands it.

• Privacy-enhancing tech: Zero-knowledge proofs, blind signatures, multiparty computation—the usual cryptography suspects, though still not plug-and-play at national scale.

• Chaumian eCash 2.0: BIS’s Tourbillon prototype tested anonymous, quantum-resistant tokens that can still be audited for counterfeits.

Europe is pushing hardest on “high privacy.” The US prefers to mumble vaguely about “balancing innovation and compliance.”

Offline payments: the holy grail nobody has solved

Everyone wants cash-like resilience—value that changes hands without network coverage. The BIS Polaris handbook lays out the requirements: tamper-resistant hardware, risk caps, reconciliation protocols, and a tolerance for lost devices. But no one has rolled out a national-scale solution yet. Offline CBDC remains the most technically gnarly corner of the map.

Field lessons: what went wrong and right

• DCash (Eastern Caribbean): The network went dark because someone forgot to renew a security certificate. Let that sink in: a digital currency taken down by the IT equivalent of an overdue library book.

• Sand Dollar (Bahamas): First-mover advantage, but still struggling with adoption. The tech works, the people are ambivalent.

• eNaira (Nigeria): Same story—big launch, lukewarm uptake. Reminds us that you can build the rails, but you can’t force the train to run.

• JAM-DEX (Jamaica): Got attention by literally paying people to sign up. Adoption through incentives—go figure.

The cross-border obsession

Domestic CBDCs are one thing. The real prize is cross-border payments: instant, cheap settlement without correspondent banks clipping the ticket.

• mBridge (China, UAE, Thailand, Hong Kong): Live MVP for wholesale settlement across currencies.

• Project Cedar (NY Fed): Demonstrated atomic FX settlement in seconds.

• Project Jura & Helvetia (Europe/Switzerland): Proved delivery-versus-payment on tokenized assets with wholesale CBDC.

• Icebreaker (Nordics + Israel): Hub-and-spoke model for retail CBDCs exchanging across borders.

The tech works. The sticking point is governance—who runs the hub, who enforces rules, and who eats the cost of failure.

So what’s the “safe” design?

If you distill hundreds of pages of public research, you get a recipe:

• Two-tier distribution with a central bank core and intermediaries at the edge.

• API-first architecture so wallets and fintechs can innovate without destabilizing the base.

• Minimal core ledger, leaving programmability and policy knobs to the wallet/API layer.

• Privacy-enhancing features baked in early, with selective disclosure as the default.

• Dedicated offline subsystem with risk caps and secure hardware.

• Interoperability plan from day one, whether through shared platforms (mBridge), interlinked ledgers (Jura), or hub-and-spoke models (Icebreaker).

And above all: operational discipline. The DCash outage taught everyone that grand designs crumble if you forget to renew a certificate.

The open debates

• How much privacy is enough?

• Should retail or wholesale CBDC come first?

• Can offline ever really be secure?

• Do central banks risk crowding out private innovation?

• Who actually governs cross-border corridors?

None of these questions have neat answers, which is why CBDC papers read like Choose-Your-Own-Adventure novels.

Final thought

CBDCs aren’t just a monetary experiment. They’re a stress test of how much trust people are willing to hand back to central banks in a digital age. The architecture is emerging—two-tier, API-driven, privacy-tempered—but the politics will decide if anyone actually uses the thing.

Money is already mostly digital. The real question is whether the next upgrade to the operating system comes from the public sector, the private sector, or some uneasy hybrid.

Allies spy on allies. Everyone in intelligence knows it, but the public hates to admit it. When it comes to Israel and the United States, the espionage trail isn’t rumor—it’s court records, DOJ press releases, and declassified intelligence assessments. For decades, Israel has run some of the most aggressive collection efforts inside America, and Washington has responded with a mix of prosecutions, cover-ups, and shrugs.

Here’s some of the documented history, stripped of spin.

The Pollard Affair

The name Jonathan Jay Pollard still echoes in counterintelligence circles. Pollard was a Navy intelligence analyst who, between 1984 and 1985, passed highly classified documents to Israel’s LAKAM unit. In 1986 he pled guilty to conspiracy to deliver national defense information to a foreign government.

In 1987 he was sentenced to life in prison, one of the stiffest sentences ever handed to an American spying for an ally (D.C. Circuit opinion). His Israeli handler Aviem Sella was indicted but never extradited. The mastermind, Rafi Eitan, headed LAKAM, which was disbanded in the scandal’s aftermath.

Pollard spent three decades in prison, paroled in 2015, and had his restrictions lifted in 2020. Israel later embraced him as a hero, granting him citizenship.

Ben-Ami Kadish: The Quiet Sequel

In 2008, the FBI arrested Ben-Ami Kadish, a retired mechanical engineer who worked at a U.S. Army research center in New Jersey. Between 1980 and 1985, Kadish had passed classified documents on missile systems and nuclear weapons to—astonishingly—the same Israeli official tied to Pollard: Yossi Yagur.

Kadish pled guilty to conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Israel. He was fined $50,000 and received no prison time, largely because of his age. It was a quiet echo of Pollard, but it confirmed a pattern: this wasn’t a one-off operation.

Franklin and the AIPAC Collapse

The 2000s brought the Lawrence Franklin case, where a Pentagon analyst leaked classified information on Iran to two senior AIPAC officials—Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman—and to an Israeli diplomat.

Franklin pled guilty in 2005 under the Espionage Act and was sentenced to over 12 years (later reduced). Rosen and Weissman, however, became the center of a sensational trial. The DOJ tried to prosecute them under the Espionage Act—an extraordinary move against lobbyists—but in 2009, prosecutors dropped all charges.

The collapse of the AIPAC case stands as one of the most glaring examples of politics derailing espionage prosecutions.

The Nozette Sting

In 2009, the FBI launched an undercover sting against Stewart Nozette, a scientist with deep ties to U.S. nuclear and space programs. Agents posed as Mossad operatives. Nozette quickly agreed to sell classified secrets for cash.

In 2011 he pled guilty to attempted espionage and was sentenced to 13 years in prison (DOJ press release).

Israel wasn’t actually involved—the “handlers” were FBI agents—but the fact the FBI used Mossad as bait says a lot about credibility.

Procurement and Nuclear Secrets

Espionage isn’t always cloak-and-dagger. Sometimes it’s paperwork and exports.

• Richard Kelly Smyth, head of a California company, illegally exported krytrons—nuclear triggers—to Israel in the 1980s. He fled, was arrested in 2001, and pled guilty to export violations (Los Angeles Times coverage).
• Hollywood producer Arnon Milchan later admitted he had been part of Israel’s clandestine procurement network, helping funnel sensitive U.S. technology into Israeli weapons programs.

And before that, in the 1960s, there was NUMEC—a Pennsylvania plant where highly enriched uranium went missing. CIA and Atomic Energy Commission officials long suspected it ended up in Israel. The case was never prosecuted, but declassified memos show the suspicions.

What U.S. Intelligence Really Thinks

For anyone tempted to dismiss these as relics of the Cold War, the U.S. intelligence community has said otherwise.

• A 2008 NSA memo, revealed by Edward Snowden and published by The Guardian, described Israel as a “good SIGINT partner” but admitted: “they target us to learn our positions” on Middle East issues.
• A National Intelligence Estimate ranked Israel as the third most aggressive intelligence service against the United States, behind only China and Russia.

This is not internet rumor—it’s the official assessment of American intelligence agencies.

Spyware: The 21st Century Front

Today’s espionage is digital, and Israel’s role continues.

• In 2021, the U.S. Commerce Department blacklisted NSO Group and Candiru, citing their role in surveillance of U.S. persons (Federal Register notice).
• In 2024, the Treasury Department sanctioned Intellexa, another Israeli-linked spyware consortium, for targeting Americans, including U.S. officials.

The message was clear: Israeli-linked surveillance firms aren’t just shady—they’re national security threats.

Allegations That Didn’t Stick

Some claims remain “officially” unproven.

• The “Israeli art students” of 2001: DEA documented suspicious door-to-door visits near federal offices. DOJ said there was no substantiated espionage (DEA memo coverage).
• Alleged Israeli telecom backdoors (Amdocs, Comverse): heavily reported post-9/11, but no charges or official findings ever confirmed them (Fox News archive).

The Pattern

Put all this together, and the picture is plain:

• Classic espionage: Pollard, Kadish, Franklin, Nozette.
• Illegal procurement: Smyth, Milchan, possibly NUMEC.
• Intelligence assessments: Israel ranked as one of the top collectors against the U.S.
• Modern cyber: NSO, Candiru, Intellexa sanctioned for targeting Americans.

The U.S. has prosecuted when it could, quietly dropped cases when it couldn’t, and buried scandals when politics demanded it.

Conclusion

Allies spy on allies. That’s the way of the world. But the United States has spent decades pretending Israel doesn’t spy on it. That’s the lie.

From stolen nuclear secrets to aggressive lobbying pipelines, from FBI stings to modern spyware hacks, the history is public and undeniable. Court dockets, declassified documents, and sanctions lists tell the story.

The real scandal isn’t that Israel spies—it’s that the American public is told it doesn’t happen.

Read more »

MKitch3|Sept 20,2025

This post continues the thread I began in an earlier article, Principles of Tyranny. Part of the inspiration for this addition comes from the Tenth Amendment Center. I’m going to keep hammering on the theme of tyranny, because it’s not a subject that can be brushed off in a single essay. Future posts will dig even deeper, each one adding more detail and context.

It’s an essential topic—one that every American should be well-versed in and ready to call out wherever it rears its head.

The Partisan Road to Tyranny: George Washington’s Fatal Prediction

George Washington’s Fatal Warning and Prediction

“A frightful despotism.”

George Washington knew what was coming. His Farewell Address, published on September 19, 1796 in the American Daily Advertiser, wasn’t just a retirement notice. It was a dire warning against things like skyrocketing debt and entangling foreign alliances.

But his sharpest, most prophetic warnings were about political parties and the constant fight for power they would unleash, a fight that could only end in total tyranny

A WARNING FOR THE AGES

Washington saw political parties as such a great threat because they were the most dangerous expression of a deeper poison: the mindset of putting party loyalty above all else.

“Let me now take a more comprehensive view, & warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party, generally.”

He argued this partisan instinct, while a universal human trait, gets supercharged in a republic where it grows to its most extreme and destructive form.

“This spirit, unfortunately, is inseperable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human Mind. It exists under different shapes in all Governments, more or less stifled, controuled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly their worst enemy.”

This mentality inevitably turns politics into an endless cycle of weaponized power and revenge that creates a “frightful despotism.”

“The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissention, which in different ages & countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism.”

This chaotic warfare between factions is just a temporary phase, a prelude to something far worse: a stable and permanent tyranny.

“But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism.”

Washington saw the endgame clearly: a population suffering from constant strife will see a dictator not as a threat, but as a welcome relief.

“The disorders & miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security & repose in the absolute power of an Individual: and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public Liberty.”

THE DAILY DAMAGE

Washington saw two threats: immediate and long-term. Permanent despotism lay far ahead in the future. But the daily rot of partisanship was the immediate disease paving the road to get there.

“Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight) the common & continual mischiefs of the spirit of Party are sufficient to make it the interest and the duty of a wise People to discourage and restrain it.”

He laid out the specific consequences: a government that can’t function (don’t threaten us with a good time!), a public poisoned by paranoia, and mobs in the streets.

“It serves always to distract the Public Councils and enfeeble the Public Administration. It agitates the Community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot & insurrection.”

Worse, he warned that these internal divisions act as an open invitation for foreign enemies to corrupt the entire system.

“It opens the door to foreign influence & corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country, are subjected to the policy and will of another.”

FUEL FOR THE FIRE

Washington conceded a critical point: under a king, political factions can act as a useful check on absolute power.

“There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the Administration of the Government and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty. This within certain limits is probably true—and in Governments of a Monarchical cast Patriotism may look with endulgence, if not with favour, upon the spirit of party.”

But in a republic, he argued, that same spirit is not a check on power; it’s gasoline poured on a fire.

“But in those of the popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate & assuage it. A fire not to be quenched; it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest instead of warming it should consume.”

He then connected the dots. The partisan firefight inevitably tempts the winners to ignore the Constitution and consolidate power.

“It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free Country should inspire caution, in those entrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective Constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the Powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create whatever the form of government, a real despotism.”

WEAPON AGAINST FREEDOM

Washington built his case for the Constitution’s design on a brutally honest assessment of human nature: people are addicted to power and gladly abuse it.

“A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position.”

Because of this, he argued that guarding these boundaries is just as important as drawing them.

“The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power; by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, & constituting each the Guardian of the Public Weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient & modern; some of them in our country & under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them.”

Washington pointed to the amendment process as the legal way to change things. Don’t like how power is divided? Use the process. It’s also a reminder that the people are in charge, not the government.

“If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates.”

But he warned that ignoring the rules to achieve a short-term goal – no matter how noble it seems – is the classic tool of tyrants: a weapon to destroy freedom.

“But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.”

THE BRUTAL TRUTH

The largest government in the history of the world loves it when the people fight among themselves.

This creates a vicious feedback loop. The bigger the power in government, the more vicious the fight to control it. And the more vicious the fight, the more power people demand the government take to restore order.

It’s the exact cycle Washington warned would produce a “frightful” and “permanent despotism.”

The end result? “The ruins of public liberty.”

These are George Washington’s farewell warnings that almost everyone ignores today – and if we don’t heed them, the worst is yet to come.