The Wolfowitz Doctrine, PNAC, 9/11, and the Wars That Followed: The Architecture of a Hegemonic Century Part 1

By MK3 — Margin of the Law

The connection between the Wolfowitz Doctrine, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), 9/11, and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is one of the most significant and controversial narratives in modern history. It represents the culmination of a decades-long neoconservative strategy that found its pretext and opportunity in a national tragedy.-MK3


I. Prologue: The American Moment

The Cold War’s end in 1991 left the United States as the sole superpower on a planet suddenly without balance. The Soviet Union collapsed, China had not yet risen, and Washington found itself standing atop a global system it had long sought to contain. The question among policymakers wasn’t whether America should lead—but how far that leadership should extend, and by what means it should be maintained.

What emerged from this moment was not an accident of history. It was the product of a distinct ideology—American primacy, engineered in policy think-tanks and later written into the blueprints of war.


 II. The Blueprint: The 1992 “Wolfowitz Doctrine”

In 1992, a classified Pentagon document called the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) leaked to the New York Times. Drafted under Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and authored largely by Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad, it declared that America’s goal should be to prevent the rise of any future rival power—militarily, politically, or economically.

Its core message was blunt:

“Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival.”

The doctrine called for unilateral action when necessary, preemptive strikes to neutralize threats before they formed, and a forward military presence across the globe to preserve U.S. supremacy.

Critics compared it to a manifesto for empire. The backlash forced the White House to tone it down publicly, but the strategic DNA remained. The Wolfowitz Doctrine was the embryo of what would later be called the Bush Doctrine.


 III. The Engine Room: PNAC and the Return of the Hawks

In 1997, a group of defense intellectuals—many of them veterans of the Cheney-Wolfowitz network—founded the Project for the New American Century (PNAC).

Its Statement of Principles, signed by future Bush administration heavyweights—Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, and Zalmay Khalilzad—argued for nothing less than a military and moral renewal of American global dominance.

PNAC’s key pillars:

  • Dramatically increased defense spending
  • Willingness to act unilaterally
  • Preemptive strikes against emerging threats
  • Regime change in Iraq

In 1998, PNAC sent an open letter to President Clinton demanding the removal of Saddam Hussein. Two years later, its 90-page report, Rebuilding America’s Defenses, laid out a plan for transforming the U.S. military and reshaping the Middle East. One line would become infamous:

“Further, the process of transformation... is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.”

That sentence now seen as prophecy, was a statement of political realism: major changes often require major shocks.


 IV. The Catalyst: 9/11

On September 11, 2001, that catalytic event arrived.

Within weeks, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), granting the president near-blanket authority to pursue those responsible for the attacks “and associated forces.” The War on Terror was born—an open-ended campaign with no geographic or temporal limit.

Afghanistan was first. The Taliban fell quickly, but the mission expanded into a two-decade nation-building project that ultimately collapsed back into Taliban control in 2021.

Then came Iraq. Almost immediately after 9/11, several PNAC alumni within the Bush administration argued that Saddam Hussein posed a renewed threat—through weapons of mass destruction, ties to terrorism, and defiance of the United Nations.

The 2002 National Security Strategy explicitly announced the doctrine of preemptive war—a direct descendant of Wolfowitz’s 1992 framework. The ground had been prepared long before the towers fell.


 V. The Invasion of Iraq: 2003

On March 19, 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq. The stated reasons: to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, end Saddam’s support for terrorism, and spread democracy through the Middle East.

But the WMDs were never found.

The 9/11 Commission later confirmed no operational link between Saddam and al-Qaeda.

The supposed intelligence turned out to be cherry-picked, coerced, or outright wrong.

The occupation dissolved Iraq’s army, dismantled its state institutions, and set off a sectarian insurgency that bled the region for years. Out of that chaos emerged al-Qaeda in Iraq, which evolved into the Islamic State (ISIS).


 VI. Afghanistan and the Long War

Afghanistan became the proving ground for counterinsurgency theory and drone warfare. Each administration rebranded the mission—nation-building, counterterrorism, regional stabilization—but none achieved lasting victory.

By the time of the 2021 withdrawal, the Taliban controlled more territory than it had in 2001. Twenty years, hundreds of thousands of deaths, trillions of dollars, and the geopolitical map looked eerily unchanged.


 VII. The Continuity of Doctrine

The connection between the Wolfowitz Doctrine, PNAC, 9/11, and the Iraq–Afghanistan wars isn’t conspiracy—it’s continuity.

  • The Wolfowitz Doctrine (1992) sketched the theory: American primacy, preemption, unilateralism.
  • PNAC (1997–2001) became the political vehicle that sold it.
  • 9/11 (2001) provided the emergency that made it actionable.
  • Iraq and Afghanistan (2001–2021) became its full-scale field tests.

The personnel, documents, and decisions overlap almost perfectly. What began as a theory of dominance became two decades of policy.


 VIII. Consequences: The Price of Primacy

1. Human and Financial Cost

According to Brown University’s Costs of War Project, the post-9/11 conflicts have cost the U.S. roughly $8 trillion and resulted in over 900,000 deaths worldwide, including soldiers, contractors, and civilians.

2. Strategic Blowback

Instead of securing the Middle East, the wars destabilized it. Iran expanded its influence, al-Qaeda mutated, and ISIS rose from the ruins.

3. Domestic Power Shift

The War on Terror justified vast expansions of executive authority, mass surveillance, and militarized policing at home. The 2001 AUMF remains active today—used by presidents of both parties to justify actions in at least 22 countries.

4. Erosion of Credibility

When the U.S. failed to find WMDs, its global reputation cratered. Allies questioned American intelligence; adversaries exploited the credibility gap. “Preemption” quietly gave way to “strategic patience.”


 IX. Historical Legacy

The early 21st century may well be remembered as the era when an idea became an empire’s reflex—when the pursuit of permanent dominance replaced containment or diplomacy as America’s default posture.

The Wolfowitz Doctrine envisioned a world permanently structured around U.S. military superiority. PNAC evangelized that vision. 9/11 unlocked it. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated its limits.

The global consequences continue to ripple: fractured states, displaced millions, emboldened rivals, and a United States wrestling with the weight of its own ambitions.


 X. Epilogue: Lessons in Hegemony

The lesson isn’t that a hidden cabal plotted endless war. It’s that policy inertia and ideological certainty can create the same outcome—without conspiracy, just conviction. When a state begins to see preemption as defense and dominance as stability, perpetual war becomes self-justifying.

Every empire eventually learns that military supremacy cannot substitute for legitimacy.

Whether the United States learns that in time is the next chapter of the story.


Part 2 of this piece is about:

Paul Dundes Wolfowitz (born December 22, 1943) is an American political scientist and diplomat who served as the 10th President of the World Bank, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, and dean of Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. He is currently a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.