How Israeli Backdoor Technology Penetrated the US Government’s Telecom System and Compromised National Security

MKitch3|Sept. 23,2025

This was written in 2008/2009. 

Since the late 1990s, federal agents have reported systemic communications security breaches at the Department of Justice, FBI, DEA, the State Department, and the White House. Several of the alleged breaches, these agents say, can be traced to two hi-tech communications companies, Verint Inc. (formerly Comverse Infosys), and Amdocs Ltd., that respectively provide major wiretap and phone billing/record-keeping software contracts for the US government.

Together, Verint and Amdocs form part of the backbone of the government’s domestic intelligence surveillance technology. Both companies are based in Israel – having arisen to prominence from that country’s cornering of the information technology market – and are heavily funded by the Israeli government, with connections to the Israeli military and Israeli intelligence (both companies have a long history of board memberships dominated by current and former Israeli military and intelligence officers). Verint is considered the world leader in “electronic interception” and hence an ideal private sector candidate for wiretap outsourcing. Amdocs is the world’s largest billing service for telecommunications, with some $2.8 billion in revenues in 2007, offices worldwide, and clients that include the top 25 phone companies in the United States that together handle 90 percent of all call traffic among US residents. 

The companies’ operations, sources suggest, have been infiltrated by freelance spies exploiting encrypted trapdoors in Verint/Amdocs technology and gathering data on Americans for transfer to Israeli intelligence and other willing customers (particularly organized crime). “The fact of the vulnerability of our telecom backbone is indisputable,” says a high level US intelligence officer who has monitored the fears among federal agents. “How it came to pass, why nothing has been done, who has done what – these are the incendiary questions.” If the allegations are true, the electronic communications gathered up by the NSA and other US intelligence agencies might be falling into the hands of a foreign government. Reviewing the available evidence, Robert David Steele, a former CIA case officer and today one of the foremost international proponents for “public intelligence in the public interest,” tells me that “Israeli penetration of the entire US telecommunications system means that NSA’s warrantless wiretapping actually means Israeli warrantless wiretapping.”

As early as 1999, the National Security Agency issued a warning that records of US government telephone calls were ending up in foreign hands – Israel’s, in particular. In 2002, assistant US Attorney General Robert F. Diegelman issued an eyes only memo on the matter to the chief information technology (IT) officers at the Department of Justice. IT officers oversee everything from the kind of cell phones agents carry to the wiretap equipment they use in the field; their defining purpose is secure communications. Diegelman’s memo was a reiteration, with overtones of reprimand, of a new IT policy instituted a year earlier, in July 2001, in an internal Justice order titled “2640.2D Information Technology Security.” Order 2640.2D stated that “Foreign Nationals shall not be authorized to access or assist in the development, operation, management or maintenance of Department IT systems.” This might not seem much to blink at in the post-9/11 intel and security overhaul. Yet 2640.2D was issued a full two months before the Sept. 11 attacks. What group or groups of foreign nationals had close access to IT systems at the Department of Justice? Israelis, according to officials in law enforcement. One former Justice Department computer crimes prosecutor tells me, speaking on background, “I’ve heard that the Israelis can listen in to our calls.”

Retired CIA counterterrorism and counterintelligence officer Philip Giraldi says this is par for the course in the history of Israeli penetrations in the US He notes that Israel always features prominently in the annual FBI report called “Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage” – Israel is second only to China in stealing US business secrets. The 2005 FBI report states, for example, “Israel has an active program to gather proprietary information within the United States. These collection activities are primarily directed at obtaining information on military systems and advanced computing applications that can be used in Israel’s sizable armaments industry.” A key Israeli method, warns the FBI report, is computer intrusion.

In the big picture of US government spying on Americans, the story ties into 1994 legislation called the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, or CALEA, which effected a sea-change in methods of electronic surveillance. Gone are the days when wiretaps were conducted through on-site tinkering with copper switches. CALEA mandated sweeping new powers of surveillance for the digital age, by linking remote computers into the routers and hubs of telecom firms – a spyware apparatus linked in real-time, all the time, to American telephones and modems. CALEA made spy equipment an inextricable ligature in our telephonic life. Top officials at the FBI pushed for the legislation, claiming it would improve security, but many field agents have spoken up to complain that CALEA has done exactly the opposite. The data-mining techniques employed by NSA in its wiretapping exploits could not have succeeded without the technology mandated by CALEA. It could be argued that CALEA is the hidden heart of the NSA wiretap scandal.

THE VERINT CONNECTION

According to former CIA officer Giraldi and other US intelligence sources, software manufactured and maintained by Verint, Inc. handles most of American law enforcement’s wiretaps. Says Giraldi: “Phone calls are intercepted, recorded, and transmitted to US investigators by Verint, which claims that it has to be ‘hands on’ with its equipment to maintain the system.” Giraldi also notes Verint is reimbursed for up to 50 percent of its R&D costs by the Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade. According to Giraldi, the extent of the use of Verint technology “is considered classified,” but sources have spoken out and told Giraldi they are worried about the security of Verint wiretap systems. The key concern, says Giraldi, is the issue of a “trojan” embedded in the software.

A Trojan in information security hardware/software is a backdoor that can be accessed remotely by parties who normally would not have access to the secure system. Allegations of massive Trojan spying have rocked the Israeli business community in recent years. An AP article in 2005 noted, “Top Israeli blue chip companies…are suspected of using illicit surveillance software to steal information from their rivals and enemies.” Over 40 companies have come under scrutiny. “It is the largest cybercrime case in Israeli history,” Boaz Guttmann, a veteran cybercrimes investigator with the Israeli national police, tells me. “Trojan horse espionage is part of the way of life of companies in Israel. It’s a culture of spying.”

This is of course the culture on which the US depends for much of its secure software for data encryption and telephonic security. “There’s been a lot discussion of how much we should trust security products by Israeli telecom firms,” says Philip Zimmerman, one of the legendary pioneers of encryption technology (Zimmerman invented the cryptographic and privacy authentication system known as Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP, now one of the basic modern standards for communications encryption). “Generally speaking, I wouldn’t trust stuff made overseas for data security,” says Zimmerman. “A guy at NSA InfoSec” – the information security division of the National Security Agency – “once told me, ‘Foreign-made crypto is our nightmare.’ But to be fair, as our domestic electronics industry becomes weaker and weaker, foreign-made becomes inevitable.” Look at where the expertise is, Zimmerman adds: Among the ranks of the International Association for Cryptological Research, which meets annually, there is a higher percentage of Israelis than any other nationality. The Israeli-run Verint is today the provider of telecom interception systems deployed in over 50 countries.

Carl Cameron, chief politics correspondent at Fox News Channel, is one of the few reporters to look into federal agents’ deepening distress over possible trojans embedded in Verint technology. In a wide-ranging four-part investigation into Israeli-linked espionage that aired in December 2001, Cameron made a number of startling discoveries regarding Verint, then known as Comverse Infosys. Sources told Cameron that “while various FBI inquiries into Comverse have been conducted over the years,” the inquiries had “been halted before the actual equipment has ever been thoroughly tested for leaks.” Cameron also noted a 1999 internal FCC document indicating that “several government agencies expressed deep concerns that too many unauthorized non-law enforcement personnel can access the wiretap system.” Much of this access was facilitated through “remote maintenance.”

Immediately following the Cameron report, Comverse Infosys changed its name to Verint, saying the company was “maturing.” (The company issued no response to Cameron’s allegations, nor did it threaten a lawsuit.) Meanwhile, security officers at DEA, an adjunct of the Justice Department, began examining the agency’s own relationship with Comverse/Verint. In 1997, DEA transformed its wiretap infrastructure with the $25 million procurement from Comverse/Verint of a technology called “T2S2” – “translation and transcription support services” – with Comverse/Verint contracted to provide the hardware and software, plus “support services, training, upgrades, enhancements and options throughout the life of the contract,” according to the “contracts and acquisitions” notice posted on the DEA’s website. This was unprecedented. Prior to 1997, DEA staff used equipment that was developed and maintained in-house.

But now Cameron’s report raised some ugly questions of vulnerability in T2S2.

The director of security programs at DEA, Heidi Raffanello, was rattled enough to issue an internal communiqué on the matter, dated Dec. 18, 2001, four days after the final installment in the Cameron series. Referencing the Fox News report, she worried that “Comverse remote maintenance” was “not addressed in the C&A [contracts and acquisitions] process.” She also cited the concerns in Justice Department order 2640.2D, and noted that the “Administrator” – meaning then DEA head Asa Hutchinson – had been briefed. Then there was this stunner: “It remains unclear if Comverse personnel are security cleared, and if so, who are they and what type of clearances are on record….Bottom line we should have caught it.” On its face, the Raffanello memo is a frightening glimpse into a bureaucracy caught with its pants down.

American law enforcement was not alone in suspecting T2S2 equipment purchased from Comverse/Verint. In November 2002, sources in the Dutch counterintelligence community began airing what they claimed was “strong evidence that the Israeli secret service has uncontrolled access to confidential tapping data collected by the Dutch police and intelligence services,” according to the Dutch broadcast radio station Evangelische Omroep (EO). In January 2003, the respected Dutch technology and computing magazine, c’t, ran a follow-up to the EO scoop, headlined “Dutch Tapping Room not Kosher.” The article began: “All tapping equipment of the Dutch intelligence services and half the tapping equipment of the national police force…is insecure and is leaking information to Israel.” The writer, Paul Wouters, goes on to discuss the T2S2 tap-ware “delivered to the government in the last few years by the Israeli company Verint,” and quoted several cryptography experts on the viability of remote monitoring of encrypted “blackbox” data. Wouters writes of this “blackbox cryptography”:

“…a very important part of strong cryptography is a good random source. Without a proper random generator, or worse, with an intentionally crippled random generator, the resulting ciphertext becomes trivial to break. If there is one single unknown chip involved with the random generation, such as a hardware accelerator chip, all bets are off….If you can trust the hardware and you have access to the source code, then it should theoretically be possible to verify the system. This, however, can just not be done without the source code.”

Yet, as Wouters was careful to add, “when the equipment was bought from the Israelis, it was agreed that no one except [Verint] personnel was authorized to touch the systems….Source code would never be available to anyone.”

Cryptography pioneer Philip Zimmerman warns that “you should never trust crypto if the source code isn’t published. Open source code means two things: if there are deliberate backdoors in the crypto, peer review will reveal those backdoors. If there are inadvertent bugs in the crypto, they too will be discovered. Whether the weaknesses are by accident or design, they will be found. If the weakness is by design, they will not want to publish the source code. Some of the best products we know have been subject to open source review: Linux; Apache. The most respected crypto products have been tested through open source. The little padlock in the corner when you visit a browser? You’re going through a protocol called Secure Socket Layer. Open source tested and an Internet standard. FireFox, the popular and highly secure browser, is all open source.”

THE CALEA CONNECTION

None of US law enforcement’s problems with Amdocs and Verint could have come to pass without the changes mandated by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which, as noted, sought to lock spyware into telecom networks. CALEA, to cite the literature, requires that terrestrial carriers, cellular phone services and other telecom entities enable the government to intercept “all wire and oral communications carried by the carrier concurrently with their transmission.” T2S2 technology fit the bill perfectly: Tied into the network, T2S2 bifurcates the line without interrupting the data-stream (a T2S2 bifurcation is considered virtually undetectable). One half of the bifurcated line is recorded and stored in a remote tapping room; the other half continues on its way from your mouth or keyboard to your friend’s. (What is “T2S2”? To simplify: The S2 computer collects and encrypts the data; the T2 receives and decrypts.)

CALEA was touted as a law enforcement triumph, the work of decades of lobbying by FBI. Director Louis Freeh went so far as to call it the bureau’s “highest legislative priority.” Indeed, CALEA was the widest expansion of the government’s electronic surveillance powers since the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which mandated carefully limited conditions for wiretaps. Now the government could use coercive powers in ordering telecom providers to “devise solutions” to law enforcement’s “emerging technology-generated problems” (imposing a $10,000 per day penalty on non-compliant carriers). The government’s hand would be permanently inserted into the design of the nation’s telecom infrastructure. Law professor Lillian BeVier, of the University of Virginia, writes extensively of the problems inherent to CALEA. “The rosy scenario imagined by the drafters cannot survive a moment’s reflection,” BeVier observes. “While it is conventionally portrayed as ‘but the latest chapter in the thirty year history of the federal wiretap laws,’ CALEA is not simply the next installment of a technologically impelled statutory evolution. Instead, in terms of the nature and magnitude of the interests it purports to ‘compromise’ and the industry it seeks to regulate, in terms of the extent to which it purports to coerce private sector solutions to public sector problems, and in terms of the foothold it gives government to control the design of telecommunications networks, the Act is a paradigm shift. On close and disinterested inspection, moreover, CALEA appears to embody potentially wrong-headed sacrifices of privacy principles, flawed and incomplete conceptions of law enforcement’s ends and means, and an imperfect appreciation of the incompatible incentives of the players in the game that would inevitably be played in the process of its implementation.” (emphasis mine)

The real novelty – and the danger – of CALEA is that telecom networks are today configured so that they are vulnerable to surveillance. “We’ve deliberately weakened the computer and phone networks, making them much less secure, much more vulnerable both to legal surveillance and illegal hacking,” says former DOJ cybercrimes prosecutor Mark Rasch. “Everybody is much less secure in their communications since the adopting of CALEA. So how are you going to have secure communications? You have to secure the communications themselves, because you cannot have a secure network. To do this, you need encryption. What CALEA forced businesses and individuals to do is go to third parties to purchase encryption technology. What is the major country that the US purchases IT encryption from overseas? I would say it’s a small Middle Eastern democracy. What we’ve done is the worst of all worlds. We’ve made sure that most communications are subject to hacking and interception by bad guys. At the same time, the bad guys – organized crime, terrorist operations – can very easily encrypt their communications.” It is notable that the first CALEA-compliant telecom systems installed in the US were courtesy of Verint Inc.

THE AMDOCS CONNECTION

If a phone is dialed in the US, Amdocs Ltd. likely has a record of it, which includes who you dialed and how long you spoke. This is known as transactional call data. Amdocs’ biggest customers in the US are AT&T and Verizon, which have collaborated widely with the Bush Administration’s warrantless wiretapping programs. Transactional call data has been identified as a key element in NSA data mining to look for “suspicious” patterns in communications.

Over the last decade, Amdocs has been the target of several investigations looking into whether individuals within the company shared sensitive US government data with organized crime elements and Israeli intelligence services. Beginning in 1997, the FBI conducted a far-flung inquiry into alleged spying by an Israeli employee of Amdocs, who worked on a telephone billing program purchased by the CIA. According to Paul Rodriguez and J. Michael Waller, of Insight Magazine, which broke the story in May of 2000, the targeted Israeli had apparently also facilitated the tapping of telephone lines at the Clinton White House (recall Monica Lewinsky’s testimony before Ken Starr: the president, she claimed, had warned her that “a foreign embassy” was listening to their phone sex, though Clinton under oath later denied saying this). More than two dozen intelligence, counterintelligence, law-enforcement and other officials told Insight that a “daring operation,” run by Israeli intelligence, had “intercepted telephone and modem communications on some of the most sensitive lines of the US government on an ongoing basis.” Insight’s chief investigative reporter, Paul Rodriguez, told me in an e-mail that the May 2000 spy probe story “was (and is) one of the strangest I’ve ever worked on, considering the state of alert, concern and puzzlement” among federal agents. According to the Insight report, FBI investigators were particularly unnerved over discovering the targeted Israeli subcontractor had somehow gotten his hands on the FBI’s “most sensitive telephone numbers, including the Bureau’s ‘black’ lines used for wiretapping.” “Some of the listed numbers,” the Insight article added, “were lines that FBI counterintelligence used to keep track of the suspected Israeli spy operation. The hunted were tracking the hunters.” Rodriguez confirmed the panic this caused in American Intel”It’s a huge security nightmare,” one senior US official told him. “The implications are severe,” said a second official. “All I can tell you is that we think we know how it was done,” a third intelligence executive told Rodriguez. “That alone is serious enough, but it’s the unknown that has such deep consequences.” No charges, however, were made public in the case. (What happened behind the scenes depends on who you talk to in law enforcement: When FBI counterintelligence sought a warrant for the Israeli subcontractor, the Justice Department strangely refused to cooperate, and in the end no warrant was issued. FBI investigators were baffled.)

London Sunday Times reporter Uzi Mahnaimi quotes sources in Tel Aviv saying that during this period e-mails from President Clinton had also been intercepted by Israeli intelligence. Mahnaimi’s May 2000 article reveals that the operation involved “hacking into White House computer systems during intense speculation about the direction of the peace process.” Israeli intelligence had allegedly infiltrated a company called Telrad, subcontracted by Nortel, to develop a communications system for the White House. According to the Sunday Times, “Company managers were said to have been unaware that virtually undetectable chips installed during manufacture made it possible for outside agents to tap into the flow of data from the White House.”

In 1997, detectives with the Los Angeles Police Department, working in tandem with the Secret Service, FBI, and DEA, found themselves suffering a similar inexplicable collapse in communications security. LAPD was investigating Israeli organized crime: drug runners and credit card thieves based in Israel and L.A., with tentacles in New York, Miami, Las Vegas, and Egypt. The name of the crime group and its members remains classified in “threat assessment” papers this reporter obtained from LAPD, but the documents list in some detail the colorful scope of the group’s operations: $1.4 million stolen from Fidelity Investments in Boston through sophisticated computer fraud; extortion and kidnapping of Israelis in LA and New York; cocaine distribution in connection with Italian, Russian, Armenian and Mexican organized crime; money laundering; and murder. The group also had access to extremely sophisticated counter-surveillance technology and data, which was a disaster for LAPD. According to LAPD internal documents, the Israeli crime group obtained the unlisted home phone, cell phone, and pager numbers of some 500 of LAPD’s narcotics investigators, as well as the contact information for scores of federal agents – black info, numbers unknown even to the investigators’ kin. The Israelis even set up wiretaps of LAPD investigators, grabbing from cell-phones and landlines conversations with other agents – FBI and DEA, mostly – whose names and phone numbers were also traced and grabbed.

LAPD was horrified, and as the word got out of the seeming total breakdown in security, the shock spread to agents at DEA, FBI and even CIA, who together spearheaded an investigation. It turned out that the source of much of this black Intel could be traced to a company called J&J Beepers, which was getting its phone numbers from a billing service that happened to be a subsidiary of Amdocs.

A source familiar with the inquiries into Amdocs put to me several theories regarding the allegations of espionage against the company. “Back in the early 1970s, when it became clear that AT&T was going to be broken up and that there was an imminent information and technology revolution, Israel understood that it had a highly-educated and highly-worldly population and it made a few calculated economic and diplomatic discoveries,” the source says. “One was that telecommunications was something they could do: because it doesn’t require natural resources, but just intellect, training and cash. They became highly involved in telecommunications. Per capita, Israel is probably the strongest telecommunications nation in the world. AT&T break-up occurs in 1984; Internet technology explodes; and Israel has all of these companies aggressively buying up contracts in the form of companies like Amdocs. Amdocs started out as a tiny company and now it’s the biggest billing service for telecommunications in the world. They get this massive telecommunications network underway. Like just about everything in Israel, it’s a government sponsored undertaking.

“So it’s been argued that Amdocs was using its billing records as an intelligence-gathering exercise because its executive board over the years has been heavily peopled by retired and current members of the Israeli government and military. They used this as an opportunity to collect information about worldwide telephone calls. As an intelligence-gathering phenomenon, an analyst with an MIT degree in algorithms would rather have 50 pages of who called who than 50 hours of actual conversation. Think about conversations with friends, husbands, wives. That raw information doesn’t mean anything. But if there’s a pattern of 30 phone calls over the course of a day, that can mean a lot. It’s a much simpler algorithm.”

Another anonymous source – a former CIA operative – tells me that US intelligence agents who have aired their concerns about Verint and Amdocs have found themselves attacked from all sides. “Once it’s learned that an individual is doing footwork on this [the Verint/Amdocs question], he or she is typically identified somehow as a troublemaker, an instigator, and is hammered mercilessly,” says the former CIA operative. “Typically, what happens is the individual finds him or herself in a scenario where their retirement is jeopardized – and worse. The fact that if you simply take a look at this question, all of a sudden you’re an Arabist or anti-Semitic – it’s pure baloney, because I will tell you first-hand that people whose heritage lies back in that country have heavily worked this matter. You can’t buy that kind of dedication.”

The former CIA operative adds, “There is no defined policy, at this time, for how to deal with this [security issues involving Israel] – other than wall it off, contain it. It’s not cutting it. Not after 9/11. The funeral pyre that burned on for months at the bottom of the rubble told a lot of people they did not need to be ‘politically correct.’ The communications nexuses [i.e. Amdocs/Verint] didn’t occur yesterday; they started many years ago. And that’s a major embarrassment to organizations that would like to say they’re on top of things and not co-opted or compromised. As you start to work this, you soon learn that many people have either looked the other way or have been co-opted along the way. Some people, when they figure out what has occurred, are highly embarrassed to realize that they’ve been duped. Because many of them are bureaucrats, they don’t want to be made to look as stupid as they are. So they just go along with it. Sometimes, it’s just that simple.”

Source: http://www.antiwar.com/orig/ketcham.php?articleid=13506

by Christopher Ketcham 

Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) System Design: A Comprehensive Survey of Public Research (2019–2025)

MKitch3|Sept. 21, 2025

This is my white paper of the public research on CBDC system design across central banks, BIS/IMF handbooks and large technical pilots. This research is a year in the making and still has a long way to go. 

Executive summary

Public research converges on a few core CBDC design choices that determine performance, privacy, resilience and policy control. Across dozens of proofs-of-concept and pilots, three patterns recur: two-tier distribution with public–private roles; modular architectures that mix centralized and distributed components; and granular policy controls implemented via wallets and APIs rather than “programmable money” embedded in the ledger itself. Offline payments remain achievable but complex; privacy can be enhanced with selective disclosure or Chaum-style eCash techniques; and cross-border efficiency gains are real in wholesale settings, where PvP/DvP workflows and atomic settlement reduce settlement risk. 

1) Design goals and constraints

Policy objectives

Typical goals: maintain monetary sovereignty and singleness of money, improve payments resilience/competition, enhance financial inclusion and cross-border efficiency, and safeguard privacy proportional to AML/CFT obligations. Recent official surveys find 94% of central banks exploring CBDCs, with retail work most advanced and a sharp uptick in wholesale pilots. 

Non-functional requirements

CBDC systems target very high throughput and low latency, fault tolerance, cyber resilience, and robust governance. BIS emphasizes modular system design and the feasibility of combining centralized and decentralized components. 

2) Core architectural choices

2.1 Distribution model

  • Single-tier: central bank provides wallets and services directly. Simple but burdens private sector innovation and scale.
  • Two-tier (prevailing model): central bank runs the core infrastructure/ledger; intermediaries handle customer-facing services, onboarding, compliance and innovation. BIS Project Rosalind prototypes an API layer that exposes central bank ledger functions to private providers in a two-tier model.  

2.2 Ledger and processing

  • Centralized, sharded processors: Project Hamilton (MIT/Boston Fed) shows that a centrally managed, in-memory transaction processor can reach very high throughput while keeping the ledger technology agnostic; the codebase (OpenCBDC) demonstrates alternative data structures.  
  • DLT or hybrid: Many wholesale pilots (Helvetia, Cedar, Jura, mBridge, Dunbar) use permissioned DLT to enable atomic PvP/DvP across institutions and currencies, often with each currency on its own ledger bridged by orchestration.  

2.3 Token vs account abstractions

Designs vary between account-based models, UTXO-style tokens, or hybrids. BIS projects explore UTXO semantics for retail tokens (Rosalind glossary), while other work abstracts accounts at the API layer and treats “balance changes” as events. 

2.4 API-first architecture

Rosalind frames an extensible API layer to standardize integration, enable innovation, and enforce policy via access-controlled endpoints rather than custom ledger logic. 

3) Privacy, data minimization, and compliance

3.1 Spectrum of privacy

Central bank papers stress that CBDC privacy is not binary. Designers can hide data from some actors while revealing to others under due process, using architectural, cryptographic and governance controls. 

3.2 Techniques

  • Selective disclosure & PETs: Bank of Canada surveys PETs (ZK proofs, MPC, TEEs, differential privacy) for CBDC contexts, noting maturing but still limited production readiness.  
  • Chaumian eCash prototypes: BIS Project Tourbillon explores quantum-resistant eCash variants that offer payer anonymity while maintaining anti-counterfeiting controls and scalability.  
  • Policy direction in major jurisdictions: ECB’s preparation-phase reports emphasize “high privacy” for online and offline transactions, with holding limits and offline design under development. UK work considers privacy-enhancing approaches for a potential digital pound.  

3.3 AML/CFT and supervision

Policy levers tend to sit in wallet layers and onboarding processes; APIs can enforce tiered limits, KYC regimes, and transaction monitoring, preserving central bank separation from personal data where politically required. Rosalind explicitly targets compliance while retaining a two-tier model. 

4) Offline payments

Offline is defined as value transfer between devices without network connectivity. BIS Project Polaris provides the de facto handbook and a higher-level design guide, concluding there is no one-size-fits-all solution; solutions require secure hardware, tamper resistance, risk caps, lifecycles, and procedures for re-sync and double-spend handling. Most offerings are not yet live at scale. 

5) Resilience and security lessons from live deployments

  • DCash outage (ECCU): a region-wide interruption was traced to an expired certificate in the Hyperledger Fabric deployment, underlining certificate management and operational discipline as critical to CBDC availability.  
  • Sand Dollar (Bahamas): ongoing modernization aims to interoperate with a national fast payments platform; early research focused on inclusion outcomes and payment efficiency.  
  • eNaira (Nigeria): initial adoption and awareness challenges documented by IMF and CBN; architecture follows a two-tier DLT model with phased rollout.  
  • JAM-DEX (Jamaica): launch supported by onboarding incentives; adoption strategy research highlights the role of targeted bonuses.  

6) Cross-border and interoperability designs

6.1 Wholesale corridors

  • mBridge: multi-central-bank platform for instant cross-border settlement reached MVP in 2024; BIS subsequently stepped back, leaving central bank partners to continue development.  
  • Jura & Helvetia: SNB/Banque de France/BIS experiments proved PvP/DvP settlement with wCBDC integrated into banks’ core systems and legal frameworks.  
  • Cedar (NY Fed) & Cedar x Ubin+: FX spot settlement on DLT reduced settlement time to seconds in simulated environments, exploring multi-ledger atomicity.  
  • Dunbar: common multi-CBDC platform design and governance insights for cross-border payments across several central banks.  

6.2 Retail corridors

  • Icebreaker: hub-and-spoke model connecting domestic retail CBDCs for cross-currency payments with FX competition at the hub.  

7) Retail platform and API design

  • Rosalind (BIS/BoE): demonstrates how an API layer can mediate wallet functions, consent, and policy rules while keeping the core ledger minimal; glossary covers UTXO, RTP/ARTP, verifiable credentials.  
  • Sela (HKMA/Bank of Israel/BIS): introduces an “access enabler” intermediary to widen competition while maintaining cybersecurity and cash-like properties; non-banks can connect directly to the central bank ledger under this model.  
  • Aurum (HKMA/BIS): two-tier system issuing both intermediated CBDC and a CBDC-backed stablecoin, informing Hong Kong’s e-HKD research.  

8) The digital euro, digital pound and US policy research

  • Digital euro: ECB is in a preparation phase focusing on high privacy, offline capability, and holding limits while EU legislation progresses. Recent communications press lawmakers to accelerate the legal framework.  
  • Digital pound: BoE/HM Treasury 2023 consultation and 2024 response outline a two-tier model and emphasize privacy by design; separate work with MIT DCI explores privacy-enhancing techniques.  
  • United States: Federal Reserve’s 2022 discussion paper and public comment summary frame benefits, risks and design considerations without endorsing issuance. Technical research at the New York Fed and Boston Fed continues via Cedar and Hamilton.  

9) Technology building blocks

  • Identity & credentials: tiered KYC with verifiable credentials; policy knobs (limits, age-restricted features) applied at wallet layer.  
  • Cryptography: ZK proofs, VOPRFs and blind signatures are under active evaluation; eCash variants show strong privacy for payer anonymity with anti-counterfeiting controls.  
  • Offline secure elements: secure enclaves/SE chips and tamper-resistant counters mitigate double-spend; reconciliation protocols cap offline risk exposure.  
  • Message and data standards: ISO 20022 alignment and standardized APIs are recurring themes in BIS/IMF materials; resilience requires disciplined key, cert and secrets management, per DCash lessons.  

10) Governance, risk and operational readiness

  • Cyber and operational resilience: IMF’s CBDC handbook chapters and notes focus on securing the ecosystem across central bank, intermediaries and vendors, including incident response, change control and supply-chain risks.  
  • Legal positioning: EU is actively legislating a digital euro; UK and US remain in consultation/research phases. Wholesale pilots often operate under existing legal frameworks with central bank oversight.  

11) Open design debates (2025)

  1. How much privacy is enough? Europe signals strong privacy commitments; technical PETs are improving but are not yet “turnkey” at national scale.  
  2. Retail vs wholesale first: Many jurisdictions prioritize wholesale CBDC to resolve settlement risk and cross-border frictions; retail remains politically sensitive.  
  3. Offline at scale: Feasible, but device security, risk caps, user UX and merchant hardware remain open challenges.  
  4. Interoperability: Competing architectures exist for cross-border flows (hub-and-spoke vs shared platforms vs interlinked ledgers); governance is as hard as the tech.  
  5. Role of central banks vs private sector: Sela and Rosalind show viable models for widening competition while preserving the central bank core.  

12) Comparative snapshot of flagship projects (non-exhaustive)

Project

Scope

Key ideas

Notable takeaways

Hamilton (US)

High-throughput retail core processor

Centralized, modular, code released as OpenCBDC

Ledger-agnostic engine can hit very high TPS; policy left to wallet/API layers. 

Rosalind (BIS/BoE)

Retail API layer

Two-tier, API-first, wallet functions and consent

Standardized APIs accelerate innovation while central bank stays minimal. 

Polaris (BIS)

Offline payments

Device security, counters, risk caps

No universal solution; operational design equals cryptographic design in importance. 

Sela (HK/IL)

Retail access model

“Access enabler” broadens intermediaries

Competition and security can coexist; non-banks may connect to core. 

Aurum (HK)

Retail prototype

Two token types incl. CBDC-backed stablecoin

Useful design space for rCBDC plus tokenized deposits. 

mBridge (HK/TH/CN/UAE …)

Multi-CBDC wholesale cross-border

Shared platform for instant settlement

Reached MVP; BIS exited oversight role as partners continue. 

Cedar (NY Fed)

Wholesale cross-border FX

Multi-ledger atomic settlement

FX PvP in seconds in a lab setting; complements global interlinking work. 

Jura & Helvetia (SNB/BdF/BIS)

Wholesale DvP/PvP

Integration with banks’ core systems

Feasible under Swiss law; legal and ops integration tractable. 

Icebreaker (Nordic/IL)

Retail cross-border

Hub-and-spoke FX with competition

Pathway for connecting domestic rCBDCs across borders. 

Digital euro (ECB)

Retail program

High privacy, offline, limits; legislation pending

Tech work advancing while EU law proceeds. 

13) Practical design checklist (what consistently works)

  1. Start two-tier with an API gateway between the core ledger and intermediaries; build policy in wallets and APIs.  
  2. Target ledger minimalism, keep programmability at the edges; use event-driven integration to existing RTGS and fast-payments systems.  
  3. Engineer privacy by design with selective disclosure and PETs; adopt jurisdiction-specific defaults and due-process access controls.  
  4. Treat offline as a separate subsystem with its own risk, device, and lifecycle model; cap value and frequency while offline.  
  5. Plan for cross-border early: decide whether to interlink domestic systems (Icebreaker), join shared platforms (mBridge/Dunbar), or pursue bilateral corridors (Jura/Helvetia).  
  6. Don’t neglect ops: certificates, keys, and change control can take you down faster than code bugs, as DCash showed.  

14) Annotated bibliography (selected, by theme)

System architecture and APIs

• BIS: CBDCs – System design (2024). Modular, mix-and-match components; privacy as a key design axis. 

• BIS/BoE: Project Rosalind report (2023). API prototypes and wallet functionality. 

• MIT/Boston Fed: Project Hamilton / OpenCBDC (2022). High-performance retail core. 

Offline payments

• BIS Polaris: Handbook (May 2023) and High-level design guide (Oct 2023). Canonical offline design references. 

Privacy

• Bank of Canada: Privacy in CBDC technology (2020) and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for CBDC (2025). 

• BIS: Project Tourbillon (2023). eCash with privacy/security/scalability. 

Wholesale cross-border

• NY Fed: Project Cedar (2022–23). FX PvP on DLT, multi-ledger atomicity. 

• BIS/partners: Project Dunbar (2022), mBridge (2022–24), Jura (2021), Helvetia (2022). 

Retail cross-border

• BIS: Project Icebreaker (2023). Hub-and-spoke rCBDC corridor with competitive FX. 

Regional deployments

• Bahamas: Sand Dollar modernization (2025) and inclusion studies. 

• Nigeria: eNaira design paper (2021) and IMF one-year review (2023). 

• Jamaica: adoption and incentive design. 

• ECCU: DCash outage post-mortems. 

Jurisdictional programs and law

• ECB digital euro prep-phase updates and legal track. 

• BoE/HMT digital pound consultation and responses. 

• Federal Reserve: Money and Payments (2022) + public comments summary (2023). 

15) Minimum viable blueprint for a retail CBDC (synthesized)

  1. Core: centralized, scalable transaction processor with append-only log and deterministic state machine; HSM-backed keying and continuous audit. Hamilton-style throughput targets.  
  2. Interfaces: Rosalind-style API gateway enforcing rate limits, consent, limits, tiered KYC and programmability via rules engines.  
  3. Distribution: two-tier intermediaries (banks and non-banks; Sela access-enabler option) for onboarding, AML, customer support.  
  4. Wallets: reference mobile wallet and SDK with PETs for selective disclosure and offline risk caps per Polaris.  
  5. Resilience: multi-region active-active, cert automation, staged rollouts, chaos testing; explicit incident runbooks learned from DCash.  
  6. Cross-border: interlinking strategy evaluated early (Icebreaker hub vs mBridge/shared corridors vs bilateral PvP/DvP like Jura).  

16) Appendix: quick pointers to primary sources

  • BIS “CBDCs – System design” PDF (2024).  
  • BIS Project Rosalind report (2023).  
  • BIS Project Polaris handbook + design guide (2023).  
  • MIT/Boston Fed Project Hamilton + OpenCBDC.  
  • NY Fed Project Cedar Phase I and technical appendix.  
  • BIS Projects mBridge, Dunbar, Jura, Helvetia; updates and PDFs.  
  • ECB digital euro preparation-phase updates (2024).  
  • BoE/HMT digital pound consultation (2023) and site (2025).  
  • IMF CBDC Virtual Handbook: cybersecurity and design notes (2023–24).  
  • Live deployments: Sand Dollar (Bahamas), eNaira (Nigeria), JAM-DEX (Jamaica), DCash (ECCU).  

Bottom line

If you distill the public research, the safest, most future-proof pattern is a two-tier, API-first system with a minimal core, PET-hardened wallets, explicit offline subsystem, and an early cross-border strategy. The rest is governance, ops and politics, which, as DCash and EU legislative delays remind everyone, can make or break the tech. 



CBDCs: The Blueprint for the Next Monetary Operating System

MKitch3|Sept. 21,2025

You can’t open a financial journal or scroll a central banker’s LinkedIn feed without stumbling on four letters: CBDC. Central Bank Digital Currency.

Depending on who you ask, it’s either the evolution of money, or the most polite dystopia since QR codes on restaurant menus. But strip away the hype, and what you find is a mountain of research papers, pilots, and stress-tested prototypes. Taken together, they form a rough blueprint of what a CBDC system will actually look like if and when the switch gets flipped.

This piece digs into that blueprint—the tradeoffs, the pilots, and the recurring design patterns that matter.

Why are central banks obsessed with this?

At a high level, the goals are surprisingly sober:

• Keep control of monetary sovereignty as cash usage declines.

• Boost payment resilience in case commercial systems collapse.

• Nudge competition in retail payments where a handful of private players dominate.

• Explore inclusion and cheap cross-border rails that don’t take three days and a kidney to settle.

As of 2025, 94% of central banks are officially “exploring” a CBDC. Translation: everyone’s tinkering, but only a handful are in live production.

Core design choices

The research converges on a few forks in the road:

1. Distribution model: The overwhelming favorite is “two-tier.” The central bank runs the core ledger, while private banks and fintechs handle onboarding, compliance, and wallet innovation. BIS’s Project Rosalind is the poster child here, sketching out an API layer that lets intermediaries plug in without the central bank becoming a retail help desk.

2. Ledger structure: Some experiments lean into distributed ledgers (think wholesale corridors like Project Jura or mBridge), while retail pilots often look suspiciously like a high-performance centralized database (see Project Hamilton’s blazing throughput demo).

3. Token vs. account: Do you want each digital “note” to exist like a token (UTXO style), or do you just update account balances? Answer: both, depending on who’s running the pilot.

4. Programmability: Everyone likes to whisper about “programmable money.” In reality, most designs punt policy enforcement to the wallet and API layer—transaction limits, KYC rules, consent frameworks—not hard-coded into the core ledger.

The privacy dilemma

This is where the politics crash into the math. CBDCs force societies to pick a point on the spectrum between cash-like anonymity and panopticon-level traceability.

Options on the table:

• Selective disclosure: Share data only with regulators when due process demands it.

• Privacy-enhancing tech: Zero-knowledge proofs, blind signatures, multiparty computation—the usual cryptography suspects, though still not plug-and-play at national scale.

• Chaumian eCash 2.0: BIS’s Tourbillon prototype tested anonymous, quantum-resistant tokens that can still be audited for counterfeits.

Europe is pushing hardest on “high privacy.” The US prefers to mumble vaguely about “balancing innovation and compliance.”

Offline payments: the holy grail nobody has solved

Everyone wants cash-like resilience—value that changes hands without network coverage. The BIS Polaris handbook lays out the requirements: tamper-resistant hardware, risk caps, reconciliation protocols, and a tolerance for lost devices. But no one has rolled out a national-scale solution yet. Offline CBDC remains the most technically gnarly corner of the map.

Field lessons: what went wrong and right

• DCash (Eastern Caribbean): The network went dark because someone forgot to renew a security certificate. Let that sink in: a digital currency taken down by the IT equivalent of an overdue library book.

• Sand Dollar (Bahamas): First-mover advantage, but still struggling with adoption. The tech works, the people are ambivalent.

• eNaira (Nigeria): Same story—big launch, lukewarm uptake. Reminds us that you can build the rails, but you can’t force the train to run.

• JAM-DEX (Jamaica): Got attention by literally paying people to sign up. Adoption through incentives—go figure.

The cross-border obsession

Domestic CBDCs are one thing. The real prize is cross-border payments: instant, cheap settlement without correspondent banks clipping the ticket.

• mBridge (China, UAE, Thailand, Hong Kong): Live MVP for wholesale settlement across currencies.

• Project Cedar (NY Fed): Demonstrated atomic FX settlement in seconds.

• Project Jura & Helvetia (Europe/Switzerland): Proved delivery-versus-payment on tokenized assets with wholesale CBDC.

• Icebreaker (Nordics + Israel): Hub-and-spoke model for retail CBDCs exchanging across borders.

The tech works. The sticking point is governance—who runs the hub, who enforces rules, and who eats the cost of failure.

So what’s the “safe” design?

If you distill hundreds of pages of public research, you get a recipe:

• Two-tier distribution with a central bank core and intermediaries at the edge.

• API-first architecture so wallets and fintechs can innovate without destabilizing the base.

• Minimal core ledger, leaving programmability and policy knobs to the wallet/API layer.

• Privacy-enhancing features baked in early, with selective disclosure as the default.

• Dedicated offline subsystem with risk caps and secure hardware.

• Interoperability plan from day one, whether through shared platforms (mBridge), interlinked ledgers (Jura), or hub-and-spoke models (Icebreaker).

And above all: operational discipline. The DCash outage taught everyone that grand designs crumble if you forget to renew a certificate.

The open debates

• How much privacy is enough?

• Should retail or wholesale CBDC come first?

• Can offline ever really be secure?

• Do central banks risk crowding out private innovation?

• Who actually governs cross-border corridors?

None of these questions have neat answers, which is why CBDC papers read like Choose-Your-Own-Adventure novels.

Final thought

CBDCs aren’t just a monetary experiment. They’re a stress test of how much trust people are willing to hand back to central banks in a digital age. The architecture is emerging—two-tier, API-driven, privacy-tempered—but the politics will decide if anyone actually uses the thing.

Money is already mostly digital. The real question is whether the next upgrade to the operating system comes from the public sector, the private sector, or some uneasy hybrid.